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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, South Africa has emerged as the major destination 
for people leaving Zimbabwe.1 The migration corridor between the two 
countries is also increasingly well traversed by researchers. In several major 
volumes of essays and a host of articles, researchers have examined a wide 
variety of migration themes.2 These include the dimensions of migra-
tion;3 undocumented migration;4 the brain drain;5 diaspora engagement;6 
return migration;7 abuse of migrants’ human rights;8 migrant identities;9 
the working conditions and livelihood strategies of migrants;10 and the 
contradictory and confused policy responses of the South African gov-
ernment to migration from Zimbabwe.11 Taken as a whole, this rapidly-
expanding body of research confirms that migration from Zimbabwe is a 
complex, dynamic and increasingly diverse phenomenon. However, there 
are still some notable gaps in our understanding of the drivers and impacts 
of migration from Zimbabwe. One of the most obvious of these is the 
relationship between migration and food security. There is a dearth of 
studies examining the impact of international migration on food secu-
rity in Zimbabwe and the food security status and challenges faced by 
migrants living in South Africa. 
The general relationship between international migration and food secu-
rity is not well researched, especially in Africa. This is symptomatic of 
the wide gulf between these two areas of research and policy making.12 
The migration and development agenda tends to ignore the relationship 
between international mobility and food security. And much of the dis-
cussion on food security focuses on rural populations and livelihoods and 
downplays the importance of mobility to the survival of urban dwellers. 
An even more glaring omission is how migrants themselves cope with the 
challenges of accessing sufficient, good quality food in the cities to which 
they migrate. 
Food insecurity is sometimes seen as one of the root causes of out-migra-
tion from the rural areas of the African continent, along with poverty, 
declining agricultural productivity, and climate change.13 In addition, 
food purchase constantly emerges as a major use of remittances in surveys 
of migrant-sending households. A recent five-country study in Africa by 
the World Bank found, for example, that the percentage of total remit-
tances spent on food varied from country to country and with whether the 
source of remittances was within or outside the continent.14 Senegal had 
the highest percentages (53% of external and 73% of intra-Africa remit-
tances spent on food) and Uganda the lowest (8% and 10% respectively).15 
An earlier study of five Southern African countries by the Southern Afri-
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can Migration Programme (SAMP) found that 82% of migrant-sending 
households used remittances to purchase food (the next highest uses, at 
52%, were clothing and education).16 As many as 28% of migrants had 
also remitted foodstuffs in the previous year (with highs of 60% and 44% 
respectively in the cases of Mozambican and Zimbabwean migrants). 
The relationship between international migration and household food 
security in sending areas is beginning to command more attention out-
side Africa, especially in Asia and Latin America.17 While remittances 
are widely used by recipient households to purchase food, there have 
been few attempts to take the analysis further and examine whether 
remittances have a demonstrable impact on the food security of recipi-
ent households and, if so, whether that impact is positive or negative.18 A 
recent review of the literature on countries in Africa and the Caribbean 
concluded that “although there is wealth of research on migrant remit-
tances, none has investigated the relationships between their use at the 
domestic level and food security.”19 SAMP found that while remittances 
may have mitigated food insecurity among migrant-sending households 
in Southern Africa, they certainly did not eliminate it. As many as 47% of 
the surveyed households reported never having enough food to eat in the 
previous year, while only 16% said that they always had enough food.20 A 
national study in Ghana found that migration did not substantially affect 
total food expenditures per capita, and had “minimal noticeable effect on 
food expenditure patterns.”21 In high migration regions, however, out-
migration increased overall food expenditures resulting in a shift towards 
the consumption of potentially less nutritious categories of food. 
Studies of the changing health status of international migrants at their 
destination are more common, especially in relation to the changing food 
consumption practices and diets of migrants and immigrants in North 
America and Europe. This research literature is framed by two ideas. 
First, there is what is known as the “healthy immigrant effect.”22 The 
argument here is that recent migrants tend to be healthier across a range of 
indicators than those they have left behind, than long-term immigrants, 
and than local populations. Three explanations have been advanced for 
the effect: health screening policies by destination country authorities 
prior to migration; favourable habits and behaviours of individuals in the 
origin country prior to migration; and immigrant self-selection whereby 
the healthiest and wealthiest source country residents are most likely to 
have the financial and physical means to migrate.23 However, while these 
explanations might apply to skilled immigrants who enter countries such 
as Canada, the UK and Australia, it does not address the situation with 
other kinds of movement, such as lower-skilled temporary migration. As 
a result, there is no solid evidence on whether the “effect” applies to the 
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growing numbers of temporary migrants in the North and the South. 
However, various studies of resettled African refugee groups have sug-
gested that refugees experience higher levels of food insecurity and poorer 
diets than host populations.24
There is considerable evidence that the quality of diets of immigrants in 
Europe and North America declines over time and comes to approxi-
mate that of the local population. This empirical observation has given 
rise to the second main hypothesis – the “acculturation thesis.”25 The 
argument here is that there are culturally-driven forces that encourage 
or force migrants to eat unhealthy, processed foods that are the staple of 
the native-born in these countries. One of the major documented conse-
quences is a growth over time in overnutrition or obesity among immi-
grant populations.26 Once again, the thesis has been applied mostly to 
long-term immigrant residents of destination countries in Europe and 
North America, and not temporary migrants in the North or South.27 
Studies of the changing diets of African immigrants in Europe and North 
America have also been influenced by these two ideas.28 
Both the healthy immigrant and acculturation arguments have been 
developed and tested almost exclusively in the context of migration from 
South to North and permanent settlement in the North. Neither has 
been applied in any systematic way to migration within the South itself 
(or so-called South-South migration). Key questions that need research 
include the following: What strategies do migrants adopt in countries of 
destination to earn income and what proportion of their income is spent 
on food? Do migrants experience greater food insecurity than the local 
population in each of the various standard categories of food security – 
food availability, food accessibility, food quality, and food regularity? 
Are migrants more or less vulnerable to undernutrition and overnutrition 
than non-migrants? Does the quality of their diet change after migration? 
Where do migrants tend to source their foods, what foods do they con-
sume and with what consequences for their well-being?
This report focuses on people involved in South-South migration, in this 
case Zimbabweans in South African urban areas. It therefore addresses a 
major neglected topic in the emerging literature on migration and food 
security. This study of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa set out to 
answer the general questions outlined above as well as some more specific 
issues including: What are the levels of household food insecurity among 
migrants in general and Zimbabwean migrants in particular in South 
African cities? What are the major causes of household food insecurity? 
What are the general experiences of food insecurity among different types 
of migrant household? And what responses and strategies are adopted to 
deal with food insecurity within the household? 
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2. MIGRATION FROM ZIMBABWE  
 TO SOUTH AFRICA 
“Mixed migration” from Zimbabwe to South Africa since the end of 
apartheid has become more heterogeneous over time.29 The overall 
number of migrants has been a source of considerable speculation and 
exaggeration by the South African media and government officials. Cer-
tainly, the amount of cross-border traffic between the two countries has 
increased considerably from less than 200,000 in the mid-1980s to around 
600,000 in 2004 to over 1.6 million in 2010 (Figure 1). However, a con-
siderable proportion are temporary visitors, visiting South Africa to trade, 
to visit family or to seek medical attention. Using various projections, the 
number of black Zimbabweans in South Africa was estimated at 509,000 
in 2007.30 The 2011 South African Census recorded a total of 515,824 
Zimbabweans in South Africa aged 15-64. This should not be interpreted 
as a stabilization of migration from Zimbabwe after 2007 (since the latter 
figure excludes children) although it is likely that migration has slowed 
after political and economic stability was partially restored in Zimbabwe 
in 2009-2010. 
FIGURE 1: Legal Entries from Zimbabwe to South Africa, 1983-2010
Source: Statistics South Africa
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For most of the 1990s, the defining characteristic of migration from 
Zimbabwe to South Africa was its temporary oscillating character. Most 
migrants returned home frequently and showed very little inclination 
to remain in South Africa for more than a short time. In a SAMP sur-
vey of Zimbabwean migrants in 2005, nearly one-third of migrants said 
they returned to Zimbabwe at least once a month and 50% of migrants 
returned at least once every few months.31 However, there is growing evi-
dence that over the last decade, migration to South Africa has taken on a 
more permanent character, despite the best efforts of the South African 
government to prevent this. A SAMP survey in 2010 focused on migrants 
who had come to South Africa for the first time after 2005, and found that 
less than 1% returned to Zimbabwe once a month and only 9% returned 
once every few months (Table 1).32 As many as 46% had not been back to 
Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa and just as many said that they 
wanted to remain in South Africa “for a few years.” Another 13% said 
they wished to remain “indefinitely” and another 8% “permanently.” In 
other words, two-thirds of the migrants viewed a long-term stay in South 
Africa as desirable.
Table 1: Frequency of Return to Zimbabwe 
2005 (%) 2010 (%)
At least once per month 31 <1
Once every few months 19 9
Once or twice per year 26 28
Other 25 9
Not returned 0 46
Cannot return 0 3
Will never return 0 2
The socio-economic and demographic profile of the Zimbabwean migrant 
population in South Africa underwent several changes as out-migration 
became a more widespread response to the political and economic crisis 
in Zimbabwe.33 The proportion of female migrants was already high by 
regional standards in the late 1990s, but increased still further in the years 
that followed (Table 2). The proportion of migrants under the age of 25 
also increased over time, even as the proportion over 40 years old dwin-
dled. Over half of migrants at all times were in their late twenties and thir-
ties. Consistent with this pattern, the proportion of unmarried migrants 
grew, almost doubling between 1997 and 2010, while the proportion of 
married migrants fell by 25%. The proportion of household heads in the 
migrant population did not vary as much, but the numbers of adult sons 
and daughters did (increasing from 20% in 1997 to 50% in 2005). 
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Table 2: Demographic Profile of Zimbabwean Migrants, 1997-2010
1997 2005 2010
Sex (%)
Male 61 56 56
Female 39 44 44
Age (%)
15–24 26 15 31
25–39 (25-44) (50) 56 59 
>40 (>45) (23) 24 10
Marital status (%)
Married 66 58 41
Formerly married 8 11 10
Unmarried 25 31 49
Status in household (%)
Household head 34 28 28 
Spouse 26 13 15
Sons/daughters 20 50 43
Other family 7 9 12
Other 13 1 2
Source: SAMP
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Although Zimbabwean migrants live in many of South Africa’s urban 
areas, this study was conducted in the main destinations of Cape Town 
and Johannesburg. These cities are the largest in South Africa and con-
stitute major centres for livelihood and employment opportunity among 
Zimbabwean migrants.34 In each city, the study identified three residen-
tial areas known to be inhabited by large numbers of Zimbabweans. In 
Cape Town, Du Noon, Masiphumelele, and Nyanga were selected while 
in Johannesburg, Orange Farm, Johannesburg Central, and Alexandra 
Park were chosen (Table 3). All are low-income areas but represent differ-
ent kinds of neighbourhoods: informal settlements (Orange Farm and Du 
Noon), inner city areas (Johannesburg Central), and townships (Alex-
andra Park, Masiphumelele and Nyanga). It is therefore important to 
emphasize that this is not a study of the food security of the Zimbabwean 
migrant population as a whole, but rather of poorer, less-skilled migrants. 
The research focused on the household rather than the individual migrant. 
However, data on 762 individual household members was collected in the 
survey of 500 households. In the absence of a reliable sampling frame, 
and because most migrants have self-settled among the local population, 
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the survey employed snowball sampling to identify respondents. This 
involved identifying a small number of initial respondents and using them 
to identify subsequent interviewees through their own networks. Eighteen 
Zimbabwean field researchers were recruited and trained to collect data in 
both cities. The survey was done in November and December 2011. 
TABLE 3: Survey Areas
Survey area No. of households % of city sample % of total sample
Cape Town
Masiphumelele 63 25.2 12.6
Nyanga 93 37.2 18.6
Du Noon 94 37.6 18.8
Sub-totals 250 50.0
Johannesburg
Central 101 40.4 20.2
Alexandra Park 69 27.6 13.8
Orange Farm 80 32.0 16.0
Sub-totals 150 50.0
Total 500 100.0
The qualitative component of the research involved 50 in-depth inter-
views with selected household heads and 10 focus group discussions. 
These sought to elicit detailed food security experiences as well as under-
stand how poor migrant households cope in a foreign land. Combined, 
the in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and survey sought to 
capture information and experiences about food security status, dietary 
quality, household food sources, alternative livelihood strategies, as well 
as other relevant food security data.
4. MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD  
 COMPOSITION
In most poor areas of Southern African cities, male-centred households 
(that is, households with a male head and no partner or spouse) are in the 
minority. Of the 6,452 households in 11 cities surveyed by AFSUN in 
2007-2008, for example, only 12% were male-centred (Table 4). Female-
centred households were far more numerous (at 34%), followed by 
nuclear households (32%) and extended family households (22%). Over 
one-third of the sample (38%) were migrant households (in which every 
household member was born outside the city). The profile of migrant 
households was quite different: the proportion of male-centred house-
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holds was significantly higher (at 23%) and the proportion of extended 
family households much lower (at 12%). 
Among the Zimbabwean migrant households in the current survey, the 
proportion of male-centred households was even higher (at 39%) and the 
proportion of extended family households lower at only 10%. The fact 
that male-centred households are in the majority (three times as common 
as in the AFSUN sample as a whole) suggests that male migration still 
dominates the migration corridor between Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
However, just because male migrants establish their own households in 
South Africa (or live alone), it does not necessarily follow that they are 
unattached since many married migrants choose to leave their partners 
and children in Zimbabwe. Nearly one-third of the respondent house-
holds were female-centred, confirming that migration streams from Zim-
babwe comprise a significant number of independent female migrants.35 
Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa is far more feminized than it 
is from other countries in the region.36 SAMP surveys of Zimbabwean 
migrants in 2005 and 2010, for example, found that women constituted 
about 44% of post-2005 migrants.37 
TABLE 4: Household Structure
% all AFSUN 
households
% migrant AFSUN 
households
% Zimbabwean  
migrant households
Female-centred 34 37 30
Male-centred 12 23 39
Nuclear 32 28 20
Extended 22 12 10
N 6,536 2,053 497
Household size was small with an average of less than two. In part, this 
was because almost two-thirds of the households were single-person units 
and another 23% were two-person households. Only 10% of the house-
holds had three persons and 2% four persons. In the entire sample, there 
were only three five-person households (the largest household size). That 
said, migration from Zimbabwe has increasingly involved settlement of 
nuclear families in South Africa. Usually the head of household moves 
first and is joined by dependants. Indicative of the growth of family migra-
tion, 15% of the household members in this survey were under the age of 
20 and 8% were children under 10 (Figure 2). However, the small number 
of extended families suggests that elderly dependants are not moving to 
South Africa and also that households may be unwilling to take in extend-
ed family members while they themselves are struggling. The members 
of the surveyed households were all relatively young, with 44% in their 
twenties and 31% in their thirties. Only 1% were over 50 years old. 
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FIGURE 2: Age of Zimbabwean Migrants
 
5. REASONS FOR MIGRATION
The reasons given by respondents for migrating were dominated by a 
comparison of living conditions in the two countries. As many as 84% of 
the respondents mentioned this as a reason for moving (Table 5). Three-
quarters also said they had moved in order to work in the informal sector, 
an expression of the difficulty of obtaining jobs in the formal economy. 
Only 30% said they had moved to South Africa to work in the formal 
sector. A sizeable percentage (44%) reported moving because of food 
shortages and hunger in Zimbabwe. In an environment characterized by 
high unemployment, a contracting economy and hyperinflation, hunger 
and food shortages were an everyday occurrence after 2005.38 An AFSUN 
survey in Harare in 2008, for example, recorded extremely high levels of 
food insecurity among poor households in the city.39
Table 5: Reasons for Migration to South Africa
No. % of households
Overall living conditions 420 84.0
Informal sector job 356 71.2
Food/hunger 222 44.4
Formal sector job 151 30.2
Moved with family 82 16.4
Education/schools 66 13.2
Safety of self/family 75 15.0
Attractions of urban life 31 6.2
Asylum 31 6.2
Marriage 28 5.6
Political exile 23 4.6
Drought 21 4.2
Freedom/democracy/peace 13 2.6
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Sent to live with family 7 1.4
Death 4 0.5
Housing 2 0.3
Note: multiple response question
One of the more striking findings was the low rating given to political 
motivations for migration. Only 6% of the respondents said they had 
moved to South Africa to seek asylum and 5% that they had gone into 
political exile. An earlier study of Zimbabweans in Johannesburg found 
that political motivations peaked in the years from 2002 to 2004 and then 
declined sharply.40 However, refugee claims by Zimbabwean migrants 
soared in the period after 2004, peaking at over 140,000 in 2009 (Figure 
3). What this indicates is that many migrants were using the asylum-seeker 
process to legitimize their presence in South Africa and avoid deportation. 
Recognizing this fact, the South African government offered an amnesty 
to Zimbabweans in 2010 (extended in 2014 for a further three years), 
which incentivized 250,000 migrants to relinquish their claims for asylum 
in exchange for temporary residence and work permits.41 
FIGURE 3: Applications for Asylum by Zimbabweans in South Africa, 
2000-2010
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Because there is evidence of growing onward migration from Johan-
nesburg and Cape Town, the respondents were asked if they had con-
sidered moving elsewhere. As many as 63% responded in the affirmative 
(Table 6). Of these, almost half indicated that their preferred destination 
was a different South African city. Just over a quarter of those think-
ing about onward migration were interested in international migration 
to Europe and North America and 18% to another African country 
(Botswana being the most likely destination). A significant proportion 
of the respondents (61%) said they were likely to be better off in a dif-
ferent city or country.
TABLE 6: Preferred Destinations for Onward Migration
Preferred destination
Johannesburg Cape Town Total
No. % No. % No. %
Another South African city 83 53.5 71 44.7 154 49.0
International (non-African) destination 42 27.2 44 27.7 86 27.4
Other African country 21 13.5 36 22.6 57 18.1
South African rural area 9 5.8 8 5.0 17 3.4
Total 155 100.0 159 100.0 314 100.0
The vast majority of respondents (80%) considered migration to South 
Africa to be important for the survival of the members of the household. 
A mere 5% rated it as unimportant. Two-thirds (65%) also said that the 
effect of migration on the household was positive or very positive, while 
16% said that it had been negative or very negative. In the qualitative 
interviews and focus groups, many argued that despite difficulties in 
finding employment and low remuneration in South Africa, their socio- 
economic conditions were considerably better than they had been in 
Zimbabwe. Those who reported a neutral impact (around 17%) mostly 
argued that they were still looking for employment. 
Some migrants indicated that unemployment levels in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg were making it difficult for them to secure jobs there and 
that their chances of finding work in other centres might be better. In 
addition, most of the employed were in a precarious position with tem-
porary jobs. Some were underpaid by unscrupulous employers, aware that 
they had little recourse to the law. Others said that competition in the 
labour market with the large numbers of Zimbabwean migrants in Johan-
nesburg and Cape Town drove down wages. 
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6. EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
 PROFILE
Access to wage employment is critical to migrants in urban areas primar-
ily because it is the major source of household income. However, this par-
ticular migrant cohort was reasonably well-educated. Just 5% of the total 
household adult population had a primary education or less, 21% had 
some secondary education and 56% had completed high school (Table 
7). A smaller number (16%) had post-secondary qualifications. In other 
words, the majority of these migrants were only in a position to access 
unskilled and semi-skilled tiers of the South African labour market. 
TABLE 7: Highest Level of Education of Adult Household Members
No. %
No formal schooling 3 0.5
Some primary 11 1.7
Primary completed 18 2.8
Some high school 138 21.5
High school completed 359 55.8
Post-secondary qualifications not university 90 14.0
Some university 12 1.9
University completed 2 0.3
Post graduate 10 1.6
Total 643 100.0
About half of the members of the sampled households were employed, 
with 31% working full-time and 19% part-time. This was a 12% drop 
from the SAMP survey results in 2010, which found that 62% of Zim-
babwean migrants in these two cities were in full or part-time employ-
ment.42 Such a decrease is probably a result of the increasing difficulty 
of finding employment, especially when Zimbabwean migrants have to 
compete with South Africans and other migrants for scarce jobs. Near-
ly 40% of household heads (and 36% of all household members) were 
working informally (Table 8). In both cities, migrants were selling sweets, 
crafts, compact discs, and other paraphernalia at major train stations, bus 
stations and along main roads in the areas in which they lived. Some also 
worked as producers, primarily of handicrafts, and as advertisers for other 
informal vendors (such as sangomas). A total of 15% of the migrants were 
in unskilled manual work.
The three most common employment sectors were services (11% of 
household heads and 10% of all migrants), domestic work (9% and 11%) 
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and security (5% and 4%). Most of those in the service industry were 
employed in hotels, restaurants and bars as waiters, bartenders and general 
hands. Domestic workers were almost exclusively female. High-skilled 
jobs were held by 13% of household heads and 12% of all migrants. Occu-
pations in this category included professionals, teachers, office workers 
and skilled manual workers. However, some of the jobs that migrants were 
doing were unrelated to their areas of professional training, with teachers, 
nurses, and other professional workers being employed as domestic work-
ers and general hands. During interviews and focus group discussions, 
migrants indicated that living in a foreign land where jobs were scarce 
meant that they did not have the luxury of choice and took on any kind of 
employment to earn a living. While most skilled migrants accept lower-
skilled jobs as a stopgap measure and hope to secure employment in their 
field of training later, this often proves difficult. 
TABLE 8: Main Occupation of Household Head and Household  
Members
Household heads Household members
No. % No. %
Skilled 52 13.1 67 12.4
Skilled manual worker 14 3.5 19 3.5
Business (self-employed) 12 3.0 13 2.4
Office worker 9 1.7 15 2.8
Professional worker 9 1.7 11 2.0
Teacher 5 1.0 6 1.1
Employer/manager 3 0.6 3 0.5
Semi-skilled 114 28.7 161 29.8
Service worker 43 10.8 63 11.7
Domestic worker 36 9.1 61 11.3
Security personnel 20 5.0 21 3.9
Truck driver 9 2.3 9 1.7
Mineworker 3 0.8 3 0.6
Police/military 2 0.5 2 0.4
Foreman 1 0.2 2 0.4
Low skilled 218 54.9 275 50.9
Informal economy 155 39.0 192 35.6
Unskilled manual worker 63 15.9 83 15.4
Other 15 3.8 3 0.6
Total 397 100.0 540 100.0
Survival in the challenging South African urban environment demands 
that household members engage in other activities to augment income 
from formal employment. As Figure 4 shows, the most common addi-
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tional household livelihood strategy was casual labour with 45% of house-
holds reporting this as a strategy. Casual employment included work such 
as gardening, washing clothes, handing out advertising leaflets at traffic 
lights and washing cars. Just over one-quarter (27%) of households had 
members involved in the marketing of various goods at major transport 
terminals, on the streets, and door-to-door. It is certainly not uncom-
mon to find household members employed as teachers or office workers 
during the week and peddling their wares on weekends. Other strategies 
included selling handmade items such as baskets, wire and metal toys, 
brooms, wood and stone carvings, and crotcheted items. 
FIGURE 4: Alternative Household Livelihood Strategies
 
Credit – both informal and formal – was being utilized as an additional 
livelihood strategy. Informal credit involves borrowing from fellow Zim-
babweans and from local loan sharks at high rates of interest. Respondents 
indicated that most loan sharks were averse to lending to international 
migrants because of the risk that they would return to their home country 
without settling their debts. Migrants who took out loans were therefore 
required to deposit some form of security, such as cellphones, beds, tele-
vision sets, sewing machines and computers, which could be sold should 
the borrower abscond or be unable to repay. Some complained that they 
had lost valuable goods as collateral for debts that were considerably lower 
than the value of the assets deposited. Those who had lost assets said that 
they were aware of the risks, but were pushed by poverty and desperation 
to make the transaction. Households having difficulties finding casual 
work or other forms of income often resorted to begging. Most were 
women and children who beg in the streets or go from door to door beg-
ging for money or food. 
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7. HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND  
 LEVELS OF POVERTY 
Despite household heads saying they were better off after moving from 
Zimbabwe, many were struggling to get by. The mean monthly income 
of the households in the survey was extremely low at only ZAR1,433 per 
month, with a minimum of ZAR100 and a maximum of ZAR8,500. As 
Figure 5 indicates, 17% of the households reported a monthly income of 
ZAR500 or less, while 32% reported incomes between ZAR501 and 
ZAR1,000. In other words, about half of the households had incomes of 
ZAR1,000 or less per month, hardly adequate for the many urban expens-
es that need to be met. Only 2% of the households reported incomes of 
over ZAR4,000 per month. 
FIGURE 5: Household Average Monthly Income 
In addition to the income poverty suggested by these figures, the Afroba-
rometer’s Lived Poverty Index (LPI) was used to measure the subjective 
experience of poverty.43 The LPI scores range from 0.00 (complete sat-
isfaction of basic needs) to 4.00 (frequent shortages of basic needs). The 
average LPI for the sample households was 2.06, with a minimum of 0.80 
and a maximum of 4.00 (Table 9). This was significantly higher than the 
0.60 LPI recorded for Johannesburg or the 1.01 recorded in Cape Town 
in the 2008 AFSUN surveys. This indicates higher levels of lived poverty 
among the migrant population. More than half of the surveyed house-
holds had an LPI in the 2.01-3.00 category while only 2% had an LPI of 
between 0.00 and 1.00. 
Such high levels of lived poverty certainly reflect low absolute incomes, 
the costs of surviving in a large city, and the inaccessibility of formal safe-
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ty nets such as child grants. As many as 46% of the households said that 
they had frequently gone without a cash income in the year prior to the 
survey (Table 10). In addition, 92% of the households reported that they 
had gone without food to eat, while between 70-80% had gone without 
other basic necessities such as clean water, medicine or medical treatment, 
electricity and cooking oil. 
TABLE 9: Lived Poverty Index (LPI) Categories
Lived Poverty Index (LPI) categories 
Johannes-
burg Cape Town Total
No. % No. % No. %
0.00-1.00 Never to seldom without 6 2.4 5 2.0 11 2.2
1.01-2.00 Seldom to sometimes without 96 38.4 85 34.0 181 36.2
2.01-3.00 Sometimes to often without 141 56.4 151 60.4 292 58.4
3.01-4.00 Often to always without 7 2.8 9 3.6 16 3.2
TABLE 10: Frequency of Going Without Basic Needs
Never
Just 
once or 
twice
Several 
times
Many 
times Always
Enough food to eat 7.8 41.4 39.0 10.2 1.6
Enough clean water for home use 25.0 29.6 31.4 6.2 7.6
Medicine or medical treatment 21.4 31.0 34.0 12.2 1.0
Electricity in your home 23.8 28.8 38.0 6.6 2.6
Enough fuel to cook your food 29.8 25.6 35.6 5.2 3.6
A cash income 2.2 17.6 34.6 24.4 21.2
8. LEVELS OF MIGRANT FOOD  
 INSECURITY
The survey instrument used in this study was the standard AFSUN urban 
food security baseline survey. AFSUN uses four international cross-cul-
tural scales developed by the Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance 
(FANTA) project to assess levels of food insecurity: 
t )PVTFIPME'PPE*OTFDVSJUZ"DDFTT4DBMF	)'*"4
5IF)'*"4NFB-
sures the degree of food insecurity during the month prior to the 
survey.44 An HFIAS score is calculated for each household based on 
answers to nine “frequency-of-occurrence” questions. The mini-
mum score is 0 and the maximum is 27. The higher the score, the 
more food insecurity the household experienced. 
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The HFIAP indicator uses the responses to the HFIAS questions to 
group all households into four food security categories: food secure, 
mildly food insecure, moderately food insecure and severely food 
insecure.45 
t )PVTFIPME%JFUBSZ%JWFSTJUZ4DBMF	)%%4
%JFUBSZEJWFSTJUZSFGFST
to how many food groups were consumed within the household in 
the previous 24 hours.46 The maximum number, based on the FAO 
classification of food groups for Africa, is 12. An increase in the aver-
age number of different food groups consumed provides a quantifiable 
measure of improved household access to a varied diet. 
t .POUITPG"EFRVBUF)PVTFIPME'PPE1SPWJTJPOJOH*OEJDBUPS	.")-
FP): The MAHFP indicator captures changes in the household’s abil-
ity to ensure that food is available year round.47 Households are asked 
to identify in which months (during the past 12) they did not have 
access to sufficient food to meet their household needs. 
The average household HFIAS score of the Zimbabwean migrant house-
holds was 14.39, with a median of 14.00, a minimum of 0 and a maximum 
of 27. This score was considerably higher than the 10.7 recorded for Cape 
Town in the 2008 AFSUN survey or the 4.7 recorded for Johannesburg. 
This finding suggests that migrants are a great deal more vulnerable to 
food insecurity than their local counterparts in the poorer areas of these 
cities. On the HFIAP scale, 11% of households fell into the food secure 
category while another 5% were classified as mildly food insecure (Table 
11). The majority of migrant households were either moderately food 
insecure (24%) or severely food insecure (60%). Levels of food insecu-
rity among Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg were 
lower than those in Harare, Zimbabwe, which is consistent with the find-
ing that hunger and food insecurity are important drivers of migration. 
While not all of the migrants in South Africa were from Harare, the com-
parison is still instructive and suggests that migration improved the food 
security situation of migrant households. Whether it brought them up to 
the level of all households in the cities of destination is another matter. 
TABLE 11: Household Food Security Status
Zimbabwe 
migrant 
households 
(%)
Harare 
households 
(%)
Cape Town  
households  
(%)
Johannes-
burg  
households  
(%)
Food secure 11 2 15 44
Mildly food insecure 5 3 5 14
Moderately food insecure 24 24 12 15
Severely food insecure 60 72 68 27
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The AFSUN survey found marked differences in levels of food insecu-
rity between poor neighbourhoods in Cape Town and Johannesburg.48 
In Cape Town, only 20% of households were food secure or mildly food 
insecure while in Johannesburg, the figure was 58%. Or again, 68% of 
Cape Town households were severely food insecure compared to only 
27% of Johannesburg households. The levels of food insecurity of all 
poor Cape Town households and Zimbabwean migrant households in 
both cities are relatively similar. In the case of Johannesburg, on the other 
hand, there are significant differences (44% versus 11% food secure and 
27% versus 60% severely food insecure). The particular difficulties of 
survival in Johannesburg were captured in the in-depth interviews and 
focus groups. As one respondent noted: 
 Life is really difficult. The food is never enough and I have gone hun-
gry many times. It is particularly bad on weekends when kitchen soup 
houses are closed. Yes, things were really terrible in Zimbabwe and 
that made us come here, but to be honest, I am still struggling. I have 
to survive on charity and begging. It is tough, as I am not working.49 
Many indicated that the situation was so bad that they could only afford 
to eat a single meal a day. The severity of household food insecurity for 
the migrant households was reflected not only in the high prevalence of 
food insecurity, but also in the narrow range of foods that were being 
consumed. According to one respondent:
 It is difficult to afford the food we want. We eat the same kind of food 
day in and day out. Usually we eat pap and maguru/matumbu (offal) 
because that is what is cheap. With matumbu at least you can budget 
your little money. But we also need to eat beef, but it is expensive. I do 
not know when I last ate beef…maybe over a year ago, I don’t know. 
It’s the same food over and over again. There is no variety, but there is 
nothing that we can do. I guess we have to be grateful that at least we 
can get a meal here and there.50 
Another indicated that they concentrated on starchy foods, as they were 
cheaper and lasted longer:
 We also want to eat these nice foods, but we cannot afford them. It is 
pointless trying to buy good food and then eat for one week and then 
struggle for the rest of the month. So we would rather buy the ordi-
nary stuff that stays longer. We therefore buy mealie-meal, cooking 
oil, salt, and sugar for these are the basic foodstuffs that we consume 
in this house. That way we can keep our stomachs full.51 
The Household Dietary Diversity Scale results validate such assertions 
and indicate that a lack of dietary diversity is typical of a large number of 
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migrant households. The mean HDDS was only 5.08 out of a possible 
score of 12.00, indicating that households had, on average, consumed 
foods from only five different food groups in the previous 24 hours. Nearly 
half of the households (46%) had HDDS scores of 4 or lower (Figure 6).
FIGURE 6: Household Dietary Diversity Score
Foods consumed by most households included cereals and other foods 
made from grain, primarily maize, (93%); meat, poultry or offal (59%); 
sugar or honey (55%); other foods such as tea and coffee (50%) and foods 
made with oils, butter or fat (49%) (Figure 7). What is important to note 
is that the bulk of the food being consumed by households is high in starch 
and with high concentrations of sugar and oils. Protein and vitamin-rich 
foods were consumed in only a minority of households. 
Besides household food security and dietary diversity, the survey also 
investigated the number of months in the previous year that households 
were adequately provisioned. Only 10% of the households in the sample 
did not experience any months of inadequate food provisioning. The 
average number of months of adequate household food provisioning was 
only 7.2. Thus, on average, households experienced food shortages for 
about 4.8 months per year, a clear indication of the depth of food insecu-
rity. The months of greatest inadequacy were from January to March and 
again in September and October (Figure 8). 
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FIGURE 7: Food Groups Consumed the Previous Day
FIGURE 8: Months of Inadequate Food Provisioning 
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Eighty percent of the households reported inadequate food provision in 
January, falling to 59% in February and 41% in March. Migrants indi-
cated that the primary reason that these are the lean months of the year is 
excessive spending during the festive season, which exhausts their meagre 
savings. During these months they are therefore working to pay off debts 
acquired during the festivities. Other migrants indicated that they usually 
travel to Zimbabwe for the festive season. Because many are in tempo-
rary employment, they return in January to look for new jobs and, in 
some cases, remain unemployed for a while at the beginning of the year. 
Some companies close in December and only open again in February, 
further depriving employees of badly needed income at the start of the 
year. Between September and December, most migrant households save 
to cover the expenses that they will incur during the festivities as well as 
travelling costs. As one respondent explained:
 Right now (November) we are saving money that we will use next 
month. In fact, I started saving last month. You see, one needs a lot of 
money to go home to Zimbabwe. I stay in Kariba, over 300 kilometres 
from Harare, so I need bus fare to take me to Harare, then onwards 
to Kariba. That is more than R2,000 of bus fare from here. Because I 
will be travelling in December, transport charges will also be high, so I 
will need more money and also to pay to transport my luggage, which 
may be more expensive than the fare for the person. My family back 
home will be expecting a lot of goods because I have not been home 
for the whole of this year. So that is a lot of money needed. I also have 
to pay rent for the month of December even though I will not be here, 
because if I do not do that, then I will have a problem on return. For 
me, these two months of October and November are very difficult 
months for I have to save. Otherwise I may not be able to go home.52 
Preparation for travel home, and the journey itself, requires funds that 
reduce the resources available to migrant households to buy food. Some 
respondents indicated that they eat the bare minimum during these 
months so that they are able to save for the journey and take care of their 
families when they go back home. 
9. FOOD SOURCES AND COPING  
 STRATEGIES 
The spatial distribution of food retail outlets is a significant determinant of 
vulnerability for poor urban consumers. This is because intra-urban food 
distribution networks are tilted in favour of high-income residential areas 
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and because high-income earners usually have the flexibility of private 
transportation.53 In higher-income areas, infrastructure such as roads, 
retail and marketing systems is usually well-established and functional. In 
contrast, network systems in low-income areas of the city are generally 
poor. This creates disparities in the pricing system as food reaches low-
income areas through informal rather than formal supply chains. Despite 
this observation, the supermarket turns out to be the most significant food 
source for Zimbabwean migrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg. A 
total of 96% of the sampled households indicated that they shopped at 
supermarkets and 21% did so on a daily basis (Table 12). Patronage of 
the informal food economy was also significant, with 93% of respondents 
regularly buying food from informal vendors and 38% doing so every day. 
Small retail outlets and fast food outlets were the third most important 
source, at 87% and 21% respectively. 
TABLE 12: Household Food Sources
% of house-
holds using 
source
% of house-
holds using 
source on 
daily basis
Supermarket 96 21
Informal market/street food 93 38
Small shop/restaurant/take away 87 21
Borrow from others 33 3
Share meals with neighbours and/or friends 29 5
Food provided by neighbours and/or other households 24 4
Food aid 9 8
Community food kitchen 6 1
Remittances (food) 6 1
Grow it 1 0
Hardly any of the migrant households were engaged in urban agriculture. 
However, they did have higher rates of food sharing than poor households 
in general. For example, 33% of the migrant households regularly borrow 
food from one another, 29% share meals with neighbours and friends, 
and 24% consume food provided by other households. During the in-
depth interviews, respondents indicated that redistribution of food was 
one of the main ways to weather difficult periods as lending, borrowing 
and sharing helped to spread the risk and avert the total collapse of house-
holds. As one observed:
 We are a community of sharing. If you are unable to help others when 
they are in dire need, they will also not help you when you are in 
trouble. Our communities and networks have memories – very long 
memories and we know who gives and who doesn’t. Especially as we 
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are far away from home, we have learnt to support each other. If I have 
some food, then my neighbours will not starve.54
Although the surveyed households were generally poor and food-
deprived, they still shared food among themselves, suggesting a greater 
degree of community solidarity and positive social capital than among the 
poor urban population in general.55 
Nearly one-quarter of the households were receiving aid in the form of 
cash, food or other in-kind contributions. Seventeen percent were receiv-
ing assistance from faith-based organizations, 10% from community-
based organizations (CBOs) and 5% from non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). In Johannesburg, most of the households receiving aid 
were living in the CBD where they were being sheltered and given food 
by various churches and NGOs operating in the area.56 Some churches 
offered food on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, while others did so on 
Tuesdays and Thursdays. Few provided assistance on weekends and many 
migrants indicated that without the help of soup kitchens, the weekends 
were very difficult for them. In Cape Town, migrants in Du Noon and 
Masiphumelele also indicated that they had access to food from faith-
based organizations and NGOs. Some even boarded trains to the CBD to 
access food from food aid centres. Two soup kitchens in Cape Town were 
observed selling food to the poor for 5c a plate. 
During a focus group discussion in Central Johannesburg, migrants took 
turns to explain the importance of the aid that they were getting from 
faith-based organizations, indicating that without this support, they 
would have left the country, died or be in prison for having committed 
crimes in order to feed themselves:
 This church has been good to us. Were it not for them, some of us 
would have long perished. I can tell you that I have been staying here 
for the past two years and I have seen others come and go. But one 
thing that we all agree on is that we are very lucky to have been accom-
modated here. Even though now they give us just one meal per week, 
we are within walking distance of two soup kitchens and we get food 
from there. The food is not much, but it is what makes us survive.57
In Cape Town also, migrants reported that they were fed by church-based 
organizations and relied heavily on this help. In addition to food aid, 
migrants rely on a variety of other coping strategies when food is short 
(Figure 9). These include reliance on less expensive foodstuffs (84% of 
households), poorer quality food (78%) and less preferred but cheaper 
foods (74%). Over half said that they reduced the number of meals eaten 
per day, borrowed money to buy food, or solicited the help of a friend 
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or relative. Nearly 50% said that they reduced portion sizes while 20% 
responded by buying food on credit and reducing the amount of food 
consumed by adults in the household.
FIGURE 9: Dietary Strategies Used by Households during Shortages
In the in-depth interviews and focus groups, migrants indicated that when 
the situation is tough, they do not pay much attention to the quality of the 
food that they are buying. Instead they are preoccupied with simply get-
ting enough food for the household to survive. One respondent in Cape 
Town explained the trade-offs between the quality and quantity of food 
as follows:
 We know a lot about food quality and the desirability for us to have 
such good food. That we know. Our only problem as a household is 
that we do not have the money to buy such foods. So, when I go to 
the market or shops, I make sure that what I buy is enough for a long 
time, be it a week or two weeks. I now know where the bargains are. 
In some of the shops they sell food that is about to expire and if we are 
lucky we get some before other people grab the lot. When I go to the 
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vegetable market I get a lot of food by buying the breakages – tomatoes 
that have been squashed, onions that are dirty, carrots that are dam-
aged, and so on. These are cheap so I get more. A hard time teaches 
you how to survive and I can say I have been taught by experience.58
Because households purchase the bulk of their food, adjustments are also 
made to the household budget as a way of coping with food shortages. 
These strategies include diverting money from paying bills, rent and utili-
ties to purchase food (23%), using long-term savings (35%), and chang-
ing place of residence (23%) (Figure 10). While not paying bills can bring 
eviction notices, migrants pointed out that there are times when there 
was no option but to abscond, buy food and face the consequences later. 
An increasing number of migrants were combining households to reduce 
housing expenses and save money for food and other purchases. 
FIGURE 10: Household Coping Strategies 
10. DETERMINANTS OF MIGRANT 
 HOUSEHOLD FOOD INSECURITY
In the sampled population as a whole, nuclear households made up the 
greatest proportion of the food secure (at 35% of the total), followed by 
male-centred households (28%), extended households (19%) and female-
centred households (17%) (Table 13). At the other end of the spectrum, 
male-centred households comprised 45% of the severely food insecure, 
followed by female-centred households (33%), nuclear households (15%) 
and extended households (6%). Thus, households with a head and part-
ner would appear to be more food secure than those with a single head. 
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However, these figures are partially a function of the different sample sizes 
of the different types of households, so it is important to examine also 
the distribution of households within each group. This certainly confirms 
that food security varies by household type.
Levels of food security were lowest among female-centred and male-
centred households (7% and 8%) (Table 14). Similarly, these two types 
had the highest proportions of severely food insecure households (66% 
and 69%). Female-centred households are marginally less food secure 
than male-centred households but the differences are not statistically sig-
nificant. The biggest difference is with the other two household types. 
Nuclear and extended households are significantly more food secure 
(20% and 23% respectively) and significantly less severely food insecure 
(44% and 35%). The vulnerability of female-centred households derives 
from the fact that most migrant women are employed in low-paying jobs 
such as domestic work or as waiters in the service industry. The vulner-
ability of male-centred households derives from a different set of factors, 
primarily the difficulty of securing employment other than casual work. 
Both nuclear and extended households generally have two adult income 
earners and are therefore in a more advantageous position.
TABLE 13: Household Structure and Distribution of Food Security
Household structure Food secure Mildly food insecure
Moderately 
food  
insecure
Severely food 
insecure
Female-centred 10 17.5 8 34.8 34 28.1 100 33.4
Male-centred 16 28.1 4 17.4 40 33.1 135 45.2
Nuclear 20 35.1 10 43.5 27 22.3 45 15.1
Extended 11 19.3 1 4.3 19 15.7 17 5.7
Total 57 100.0 23 100.0 121 100.0 299 100.0
TABLE 14: Household Structure and Levels of Food Security
Household structure Food secure Mildly food insecure
Moderately 
food insecure
Severely food 
insecure
Female-centred 10 6.6 8 5.3 34 22.4 100 65.7
Male-centred 16 8.2 4 2.0 40 20.5 135 69.3
Nuclear 20 19.6 10 9.8 27 26.5 45 44.1
Extended 11 22.9 1 2.1 19 39.6 17 35.4
With regard to household size, the general principle seems to be the larger 
the household, the greater the chance of being food secure (Table 15). 
For example, only 9% of the one-person households were food secure 
compared with 15% of the two and three-person households and 29% of 
the households with four or more members. One-person households are 
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clearly the most food insecure with 64% severely food insecure compared 
to around half of two and three-person households.
TABLE 15: Household Size and Levels of Food Security
House-
hold 
size
Food secure Mildly food  insecure
Moderately food 
insecure
Severely food 
insecure
1 28 8.7 10 3.1 76 23.7 207 64.5
2 17 15.0 9 8.0 29 25.7 58 51.3
3 8 15.4 4 7.7 14 26.9 26 50.0
4+ 4 28.6 0 0.0 2 14.3 8 57.1
Without an income, access to food in South Africa’s urban areas is prob-
lematic, as virtually all foodstuffs must be purchased. As a result, food 
security and income are closely related. This was certainly the case with 
the Zimbabwean migrant households despite the fact, as noted above, that 
incomes were generally low. Even a small increase in monthly income 
has a discernible effect on food security status. As household income 
increases, so does the proportion of food secure households: from only 
1% of households earning less than ZAR500 per month, to 11% of those 
earning ZAR1,501-2,000 per month, to 47% of those earning more than 
ZAR3,001 per month (Table 16). Similarly, the proportion of severely 
food insecure households declines from 89% of those earning less than 
ZAR500 per month to 44% of those earning ZAR1,501-2,000 per 
month to 28% of those earning more than ZAR3,001 per month.
TABLE 16: Household Income and Food Security
Household 
income (rands 
per month)
Household food insecurity prevalence
Food secure 
(%)
Mildly food 
insecure 
(%)
Moderately 
food insecure 
(%)
Severely food 
insecure 
(%)
0-500 1.1 2.2 7.5 89.2
501-1,000 2.0 0.7 20.4 86.9
1,001-1,500 5.2 4.2 39.6 51.0
1,501-2,000 11.1 0.0 44.4 44.5
2,001-2,500 31.2 9.4 28.1 31.2
2,501-3,000 23.3 13.3 26.7 36.7
3,001+ 47.2 17.0 7.5 28.3
The extreme vulnerability of the lowest income households was con-
firmed in the qualitative interviews. “You are nothing if you do not have 
money,” is how one respondent in Cape Town described it, adding: 
 Here it is difficult to get anything. In Zimbabwe, we could some-
times ask people in the rural areas to send us food, but we cannot do 
that here. It is too far and anyway, the people in Zimbabwe will be 
28 AFRICAN FOOD SECURITY URBAN NETWORK (AFSUN)  
THE FOOD INSECURITIES OF ZIMBABWEAN MIGRANTS IN URBAN SOUTH AFRICA
expecting us to feed them and not vice-versa. But we are struggling 
here. The only days that I am okay in terms of food are on weekends 
because I do get paid every Friday. But by Monday or Tuesday I am 
back to struggling because the money is too little. My employer gives 
me R200 every week, but I need to pay rent and transport. It is just 
not enough, but there is nothing that I can do.59 
Most confirmed that without a stable income, and given other numerous 
expenses, they face a massive challenge in adequately feeding themselves. 
Cutting back on other expenses such as rent, electricity and water charges 
is not an option, as eviction from their lodgings will follow. Eating less and 
eating cheaper foods are sometimes the only viable option. 
Rising food prices are another major cause of food insecurity among 
urban households because of the purchasing nature of the environment. 
The global food price crisis that started in 2007/2008 led to a major 
increase in the cost of food in South Africa.60 Although the rate of global 
price increases had tempered by 2011 when this survey was done, inter-
nal economic dynamics continued to cause food prices to increase much 
faster than average income. Only 26% of the respondents said that the 
household had been unaffected by rising prices in the previous year (Table 
17). Around one-third had gone without food about once a month while 
28% had done so once a week. The remaining 14% had this as an almost 
daily experience. 
TABLE 17: Frequency of Going Without Food Because of Food Price 
Increases
No. %
Never 129 25.8
About once per month 161 32.2
About once per week 142 28.4
More than once per week but less than every day of the week 40 8.0
Every day 20 4.0
Don’t know 8 1.6
Total 500 100.0
In the face of food price increases, households have to revise their food 
budget constantly by increasing the amount of money allocated to food 
purchase, reducing the amount of food bought, or replacing it with 
cheaper alternatives when these are available. As one respondent in Johan-
nesburg commented:
 The increases are just too much. You cannot budget well in advance 
because of the increases. When I came to South Africa 5 years ago, 
things were different. You could buy a loaf of bread for the same 
amount of money for over a year without any changes. But now it 
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is different. You cannot just pick a product on the shelf and take it to 
the till on the basis that you know the price that you bought it for the 
previous month. No, you can no longer do that; you have to check 
the price. On many occasions you see people returning or just leaving 
goods at the till because the price they thought the goods cost would 
have changed. Although the increases are better than what we experi-
enced back home, it is still difficult because we do not have the money 
to make up for the increases.61
The foods that most households had to do without because of price 
increases in the previous six months included meat, poultry or offal (55% 
of households), cereals (53%), foods made with oil or butter (49%), and 
eggs (49%). In sum, over 30% of households had gone without food from 
all of the main food groups (Figure 11).
11. EXACERBATING FOOD  
  INSECURITY
Besides rising food prices, households were asked to indicate other prob-
lems that impinged on their ability to access food and to rank them in 
order of importance (Table 18). Reduced income was one of the major 
issues affecting household food security, with 35% mentioning it as 
a problem and 19% as a major problem. In most cases, loss of income 
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FIGURE 11: Types of Foods Not Consumed Because of Food Price Increases
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results from a household member losing their job, forcing the household 
to adjust its food intake. In Cape Town, for example, migrant workers 
noted that they often lose their jobs when the tourism season is off-peak 
and it is then that they struggle to put food on the table. Those working 
in the construction industry also lose their jobs in the rainy season when 
much construction work stops.
TABLE 18: Other Problems Impacting on Food Access
Problem Rank I Rank II Rank III
Relocation of the family 22.2 9.4 2.0
Reduced income of a household member 19.0 11.8 4.0
Theft 7.2 2.4 1.6
Accident of household member 4.2 0.4 0.2
Serious illness of household member 3.2 0.2
Reduced remittances from relatives 2.6 3.8 3.2
Death of a working household member 2.0
Loss/reduced employment for member 1.8
Insecurity/violence 1.2 9.8 9.4
Health risks 0.6 0.2 2.0
Political problems 0.4 0.8 0.4
End of food aid 0.4
Death of the head of the household 0.2 2.6
Floods, fires, etc. 0.4 2.8
Increased cost of water 0.6
Taking in orphans 0.2
Insecurity and violence were cited as a factor affecting food security by 
20% of households and theft by 11%. While levels of theft are generally 
high in low-income residential areas and everyone is a potential victim, 
Zimbabwean migrants strongly believe that they are targeted because 
they are foreign and that, because of their migrant status, they are insuf-
ficiently protected by the police and unable to defend themselves. These 
beliefs are borne out in extensive research on the xenophobic treatment of 
Zimbabweans in South Africa.62 After income instability, family reloca-
tion was mentioned as the most important source of food insecurity: 34% 
mentioned it as a problem and 22% as the primary problem. The fact that 
one-third of the households had relocated in the previous six months sug-
gests that intra and inter-urban mobility plays a role in exacerbating food 
insecurity. Respondents in the in-depth interviews provided additional 
insights into this issue, pointing out that the lack of reliable and stable 
accommodation was highly destabilizing to household income and there-
fore to food security. The difficulties of acquiring affordable accommoda-
tion often forced them to move in search of cheaper lodgings. However, 
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funds were then needed to need to hire transport to ferry their possessions 
as well as pay the deposit to secure the new accommodation. One house-
hold head narrated his ordeal in trying to find cheaper alternatives for his 
family as follows:
 It is a difficult life when you are continuously moving. This is my 
second month here in Nyanga. Two months ago I had been staying in 
Langa, but I could no longer afford the rent, so I left. But that move-
ment has cost me a lot of money and I am yet to fully pay the person I 
hired to relocate. I am lucky because I know the transporter from way 
back in Zimbabwe. But you know, business is business and I have to 
pay him. It is only that things are difficult. Now I do not know how 
long I will stay here. The rent was R600 for this room when I came, 
but I have been told that next month it will increase to R800. Now 
I cannot afford that amount for that is why I left Langa. Maybe I will 
find another cheaper place here in Nyanga where I can pay R400 or 
R500. What else can I do? It is difficult when you have no house.63 
The situation described by the respondent is not untypical among 
migrants who try to minimize their monthly costs by seeking out cheaper 
accommodation, but end up incurring large and immediate costs in the 
relocation process. 
12. MIGRANT REMITTANCES AND  
  FOOD SECURITY
Considerable research and policy attention has focused on the global 
remitting behaviour of migrants.64 There is also a growing literature on 
intra-regional remitting within Southern Africa.65 The majority of Zim-
babwean migrants in South Africa left parents, sisters, brothers, children, 
and other relatives behind when they moved to South Africa. A num-
ber of studies have demonstrated that most Zimbabweans remit funds 
and goods to their families back home.66 The respondents in this survey 
were no exception, periodically sending money to help with expenses 
like food, school fees, and clothing as well as investments in both mov-
able and immovable assets. Most feel obligated to send money home, not 
least because their families are struggling to survive. One respondent in 
Du Noon expressed his desire to reciprocate the support he had received 
from his family:
 My brothers and sisters contributed money for me to come here. So 
I have no choice, but to look after them. They played their role, now 
I am playing mine. Even though it is very tough here, I have to work 
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hard so that they are able to live well back home. One of my brothers 
is still in school, so I have to pay his school fees. Maybe one day, when 
he finishes school he can join me here, but for now I am their only 
hope. So I do it, and I hope that I am making a difference in their lives. 
Even if I send R100 a month, I know it will help.67
Another saw remitting as an obligation imposed on migrants by their 
families:
 There is a lot of pressure on some of us to send money home. It is diffi-
cult to ignore the concerns of those that are back home. Even if you do 
not have the money you try like a man. You can borrow from friends 
and work hard to return it. Sometimes the problem is that people back 
home think that we are making a lot of money here. So every few days 
you get a call and people are asking for money. It’s serious…some-
times people end up not answering calls from home because you know 
that it is usually about money. Yes, I know they are in problems, but 
sometimes you need some space to make some money and stabilize. 
As things are, it is difficult. Maybe when the situation in Zimbabwe 
improves, then we can stop sending money so often.68 
Only 18% percent of the households in this survey indicated that they 
were not remitting money to Zimbabwe (Table 19). Nearly 40% of 
remitting households sent funds to Zimbabwe at least once a month and 
another 41% a few times per year. Remitting is definitely a family busi-
ness, with 76% sending funds to immediate family members and 27% to 
extended family members.
TABLE 19: Frequency of Remitting Money to Zimbabwe
No. %
More than once a month 55 13.4
Once a month 107 26.2
A few times a year 166 40.7
Once a year 35 8.5
Occasionally 46 11.2
Total 409 100.0
The question of interest in this survey, and one which is rarely addressed 
in the literature, is what impact remitting behaviour and obligations has 
on the food security of migrant households in places of destination. Given 
that food insecurity is a significant problem among migrant households in 
Cape Town and Zimbabwe, to what extent is this a function of the need 
to remit, which reduces disposable household income and the amount 
available to spend on food? Alternatively, does food insecurity itself have 
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a negative impact on remitting, affecting, for example, the amounts and 
frequency of remitting?
The study did find that the amounts remitted by Zimbabwean migrant 
households were relatively small (Figure 12). Nearly two-thirds of the 
remitting migrants could only remit less than ZAR500 per month, with 
another 18% remitting ZAR501-1,000 per month. Only 17% were send-
ing home more than ZAR1,000 per month. Despite these small amounts, 
only 11% of the households indicated that remittances had a positive or 
very positive effect on the food security situation of the household in 
South Africa (Table 20). By contrast, as many as 60% said it had a nega-
tive or very negative impact on their food security. The qualitative inter-
views suggested that remitting forced respondents to adopt various coping 
strategies such as reducing the number of meals or eating smaller portions. 
FIGURE 12: Amount Remitted to Zimbabwe per Month
TABLE 20: Effect of Remitting Money on Migrant Household Food 
Security
No. %
Very positive 13 3.2
Positive 32 7.8
Neither positive nor negative 117 28.6
Negative 204 49.9
Very negative 43 10.5
Total 409 100.0
More than half of the surveyed migrant households were also remitting 
food to Zimbabwe (Table 21). Of these, 8% did so more than once a 
month, 27% once a month, 43% a few times a year and 11% only occa-
sionally. Food availability in Zimbabwe was certainly greatly improved in 
2011 over 2008.69 A similar survey undertaken in 2008 would undoubt-
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edly have found higher food flows. In AFSUN’s 2008 survey of poor 
Harare households, 42% had received food transfers in the previous year 
and, of these, 43% came from other urban areas, and 20% from both 
rural and urban areas.70 A follow-up survey in Harare in 2012 found that 
45% had received transfers, of which 35% came from other urban areas 
and 25% came from both rural and urban areas.71 In other words, while 
there was a slight fall in the proportion of households receiving inter-
urban food transfers, a significant minority of households continued to 
receive food from other urban centres. Partly, this can be explained by 
the fact that although availability improved between 2008 and 2012, the 
price of food in Zimbabwe was still considerably higher than the price of 
similar foodstuffs in South Africa. However, respondents did say that it 
was expensive to carry food to Zimbabwe as buses charge per kilogram 
rather than on the value of the goods being taken. 
TABLE 21: Frequency of Remitting Food to Zimbabwe
No. %
More than once a month 21 8.5
Once a month 66 26.6
A few times a year 108 43.5
Once a year 25 10.1
Occasionally (less than once a year) 28 11.3
Total 248 100.0
Sending food to Zimbabwe definitely affected the food security situation 
of migrant households in South Africa. As the survey results indicate, 
only 13% reported the impact as positive or very positive, while 39% said 
the effect was negative or very negative. A greater percentage said that the 
impact was neither positive nor negative (48%). Only 29% said that cash 
remitting had neither a negative nor positive impact. Why this might be 
is unclear although one reason could be that those remitting food were 
simply sending a portion of their own food supply, while those sending 
money then had less to spend on food. 
TABLE 22: Effect of Food Remittances on Migrant Household Food 
Security
No. %
Very positive 16 6.5
Positive 15 6.1
Neither positive nor negative 118 48.2
Negative 78 31.9
Very negative 18 7.3
Total 245 49.0
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13. CONCLUSION 
This report examined the food security status of Zimbabwean migrant 
households in the poorer areas of two major South African cities, Johan-
nesburg and Cape Town. The vast majority (over 80%) were food inse-
cure in terms of the amount of food to which they had access and the 
quality and diversity of their diet, both of which were extremely poor. 
Those with higher incomes were consistently more food secure than 
those with low incomes. In an all-cash urban environment, with high 
levels of unemployment and intense job competition, and no urban agri-
culture, the primary determinant of food security is access to regular, 
paid employment. Female-centred households have access to a narrower 
range of employment opportunities (mostly domestic work and self-
employment in the informal economy) and are more food insecure than 
other types of households. Overall, 40% of migrant household heads with 
a cash income were working in the informal economy where earnings 
are small and inconsistent. Another 16% were unskilled casual workers 
where, again, employment is unpredictable and income unreliable. 
Although the measures of food insecurity used in the study are different 
from those in the Euro-American literature on the immigration effect 
and acculturation (which tend to focus more on health-related dietary 
outcomes), it is worth asking if these arguments have any purchase in the 
case of Zimbabwean migration to South Africa. Because much migra-
tion from Zimbabwe is relatively recent, insufficient time has elapsed for a 
systematic evaluation of the acculturation argument that diets and health 
tend to decline over time. Further research is certainly required on this 
issue. What seems clear is that Zimbabwean migrants are significantly 
more food insecure than other low-income households in the areas of the 
South African cities in which they congregate. At the same time, they 
are significantly less food insecure than households that have remained 
in Zimbabwe. This, then, both affirms and contradicts the arguments of 
the immigration effect. In other words, migrants are more food secure 
and therefore likely to be healthier than those they left behind. But, con-
trary to the immigration effect argument, they are worse off in terms of 
food access and security than local households of similar socio-economic 
standing. 
One explanation for these differences might be that migrants do not enjoy 
the same employment prospects and income-generating possibilities as 
South Africans. Yet, rates of unemployment are generally lower among 
migrants than South Africans. They are certainly not high-income earn-
ers, but neither are their comparator South African households. The jobs 
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they do hold tend to be in the lower end of the job market in the formal 
economy, self-employment in the informal economy, and casual and/or 
seasonal in nature. As a result, incomes are low and unpredictable, forc-
ing many households to rely on more than one income stream. Migrant 
households have little or no access to land and resources to engage in 
urban agriculture and the vast majority of migrant households do not 
grow any of their own food. While this could be seen to put them at 
a significant disadvantage, rates of participation in urban agriculture are 
anyway generally low in Cape Town and Johannesburg.72 
Another explanation, which seems more plausible, is the evidence that 
South Africa’s social protection system – in particular the 14 million 
child grants that are dispensed every month – mitigate hunger and food 
insecurity among many South African households.73 Most Zimbabwean 
migrant households do not have access to social grants in South Afri-
ca. On the other hand, it seems that social networks are much stronger 
among migrants and that informal social protection – such as food shar-
ing and borrowing – is more common. However, these tend to be called 
upon at times of distress and are neither a regular nor reliable source of 
food. More common, particularly among the poorest and most vulnerable 
migrant households, is the regular use of soup kitchens run by churches, 
NGOs and CBOs, particularly in the inner-city areas.
Another reason for the higher levels of food insecurity among migrant 
households, and the fact that they are worse off than local households, 
appears to lie in the set of other pressures on migrant incomes. Like local 
households, they have to pay rent, transport costs and other daily necessi-
ties. However, a major expense incurred by migrant households that does 
not apply to others (unless they have strong links with family in rural 
areas) is remittances of cash and goods back to family in Zimbabwe. One 
of the primary reasons for coming to South Africa was to earn money 
to support those left behind. Migrants who are able to remit do so as 
frequently as possible. However, while this may have a positive impact on 
the food security of their family in Zimbabwe, it makes them a lot more 
vulnerable to food insecurity. As many as 60% reported that remitting 
of cash had a negative impact on their own food security. Fewer, but still 
40%, said that remitting of foodstuffs had a similar impact.
The small literature on the impact of migrant remittances on food securi-
ty tends to look only at the recipients and how their situation is improved. 
It does not ask the question about the impact of remitting on those who 
send remittances. This is largely because there is an implicit assumption 
that those who remit do so because they have disposable income and 
choose to spend it on remitting. However, the majority of Zimbabwean 
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migrants in South Africa, struggling as they are to make ends meet, do 
not have much disposable income or savings on which to draw. They feel 
a strong obligation to remit but, in order to do so, must make choices and 
compromises because of their limited and unpredictable income. Food, 
though a necessity, is one of the first things to be sacrificed. Quantities 
decline, fewer meals are eaten, cheaper foods are preferred, and dietary 
quality and diversity inevitably suffer. 
While migrants were generally dissatisfied with the shrinking job market 
in South Africa, as well as poor remuneration and the resultant negative 
impact on their household’s food security, return to Zimbabwe was not 
viewed with any enthusiasm. Around 23% of those interviewed in the 
survey said that their household food security situation would improve 
if they returned. However, more than twice as many (54%) said that the 
impact would be negative or very negative. Most argued that the eco-
nomic situation in Zimbabwe had not stabilized sufficiently to warrant 
return and that the likelihood of finding a job on return was low. As a 
result, the household’s food security situation would worsen. In other 
words, while food insecurity in Zimbabwe is a major driver of migration 
to South Africa, food insecurity in South Africa is unlikely to encourage 
many to return. 
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This report examines the food security status of  Zimbabwean migrant 
households in the poorer areas of  two major South African cities, 
Johannesburg and Cape Town. The vast majority were food insecure in 
terms of  the amount of  food to which they had access and the quality 
and diversity of  their diet. What seems clear is that Zimbabwean 
migrants are significantly more food insecure than other low-income 
households. The primary reason for this appears to lie in pressures that 
include remittances of  cash and goods back to family in Zimbabwe. 
The small literature on the impact of  migrant remittances on food 
security tends to look only at the recipients and how their situation is 
improved. It does not look at the impact of  remitting on those who send 
remittances. Most Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa feel a strong 
obligation to remit, but to do so they must make choices because of  
their limited and unpredictable income. Food is one of  the first things 
to be sacrificed. Quantities decline, cheaper foods are preferred, and 
dietary quality and diversity inevitably suffer. This study found that 
while migrants were dissatisfied with the shrinking job market in South 
Africa, most felt that they would be unlikely to find work in Zimbabwe 
and that a return would worsen their household’s food security situa-
tion. In other words, while food insecurity in Zimbabwe is a major driver 
of  migration to South Africa, food insecurity in South Africa is unlikely 
to encourage many to return. 
 
